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Much recent research has examined the implications of policy analysis for complex adaptive
social-ecological systems. System complexity comes from both the natural environment as well
as complex institutional arrangements that humans use to manage and regulate such systems.
Such research has systematically investigated how the interaction of a host of variables relate to
some evaluation criteria. Many scholars argue that a deep understanding of the social-ecological
systems, however, comes at the expense of externally valid inferences to other systems. In this
paper I argue that having a nuanced understanding of the social-ecological system actually helps
one to understand which types of policy domains an analysis might be generalized.
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11 Introduction
The world is currently threatened with unsustainable consumption of many natural resources in-
cluding lakes, forests, sheries, and biodiveristy loss (Ostrom, 2009). In addition, there is now strong
evidence that the global climate is threatened by the accumulation of human produced green house
gases, including carbon dioxide (Solomon et al., 2007; Stern, 2007). These environmental problems
are embedded in complex social-ecological systems (SESs). Multiple variables (both social and
biophysical) at multiple levels (international and sub-national) interact to produce these outcomes.
Recent work suggests that such complexity is inherent to the SES and that policy analysis
should embrace such complexity (Axelrod and Cohen, 2001; Ostrom, 2009, Forthcoming). In order
to analyze a particular policy meant ameliorate an environmental problem, one must understand
how the policy will interact with the multitude of intervening variables at multiple scales that will
moderate the eects of the intervention.
Much of our current policy analysis fails to take into account the complexity of SESs. Too
often, theories of policy intervention, in order to have the largest general impact, are formulated as
panaceas|universal solutions to all similar problems in all places (Ostrom, Janssen and Anderies,
2007). The most prominent example of such theorizing comes from Hardin's (1968) seminal work
on the tragedy of the commons. This theory posited that, because of the inherent incentives
that exists in common-pool resources (CPR), users would inevitably overharvest and destroy the
resource. Hardin failed to account that this theory, while very accurate in predicting the collapse
of open-access resources, does not account for the empirical evidence suggesting that resource users
can develop rules to govern the use of the commons and avoid resource destruction (Ostrom, 1990;
Dietz, Ostrom and Stern, 2003; National Research Council, 1986, 2002).
In this paper I will argue that a more detailed analysis of the research intervention, environment,
and outcome measures, and their covariance, helps to avoid the problem of overgeneralizing theory
and provides insights to the types of cases where the theoretical or empirical policy analysis might
reasonably be applied. Given that a particular policy intervention or theory can be shown to be
causally related to an outcome in the research project, a detailed analysis of the underlying causal
mechanism of the theory for specic cases or classes of cases can provide a thick description of the
causal mechanisms of a theory (Gerring, 2004). By discovering what those causal mechanisms are,
one might reasonably apply the results to othere cases, outside of the research project, where similar
causal mechanisms can be expected to operate. In order to have an understand of the underlying
causal mechanisms, however, one must understand, to some degree, the processes of the SES.
2 Complexity
In order to understand the underlying causal mechanisms of a policy intervention or theory, one
needs to have an accurate understanding of the SES. This is dicult because both the biophysical
and human processes of the SES are complex (Holling, 1973; Waldrop, 1992; Gell-Mann, 1995).
The complexity of these systems may have evolved because such systems tend to be resilient to
disturbance. Herbert Simon (1981) has suggested that evolutionarily stable systems (i.e. those that
survive over time and are able to adapt to changing environments and conditions) have subsystems
that follow a hierarchy of building blocks. In the biophysical realm, for example, a heart might be
considered a subsystem of the cardiovascular system. Blood cells are another subsystem within that
system. This leveling of subsystems allows for mutation and adaptation at dierent levels without
compromising the integrity of the system as a whole. Some systems might be \deep" meaning there
is a high degree of nesting of subsystems (hierarchy), while others are \at."
2Political and social systems follow a similar pattern. Consider the federal system of government
within the United States. This is a relatively \deep" system, with embedded hierarchies at the
federal, state, county, and municipal levels, to name a few. Experimentation at dierent levels of
the hierarchy is possible without compromising the entire system. Simon argues that without a hi-
erarchy of governance in decision-making, systems cannot adapt to environmental, social, political,
and economic, changes, and thus will not survive.1
In order to understand the causal eects from a policy intervention one needs to understand
how both biophysical elements respond to the intervention as well as how human elements (human
behavior and institutions) will respond to the intervention.
2.1 Social Systems
In Elinor Ostrom's Nobel Prize speech she argues for a more complex analysis of markets and
states (Ostrom, Forthcoming). Many of the underlying assumptions of models of human behavior
in economics and political science are based on oversimplied assumptions of self-interested rational
egoists (Ostrom, 2005). While such assumptions explain behavior well in many competitive envi-
ronments (such as markets and electoral competition) they fail to adequately account for behavior
in a number of other situations, specically the collective action dilemmas that are so prevalent
in much analysis of sustainable SESs (Coleman and Ostrom, Forthcoming). Ostrom (1991, 1998)
argues that the behavioral revolution in social science needs to be carefully integrated into theories
of political economy and institutional analysis.
Not only is human behavior more complex than originally posited, but the structure of insti-
tutions used to govern human behavior is more complex than rst thought.2 One principle to be
gleaned from the evolutionary stability of systems is that redundancy should be sought out on levels
that are more volatile when faced with external pressures, and specialization is desirable where the
benets of specializing on a particular level outweigh the potential costs of a subsystem failure.
The term used to describe allocating decision-making at multiple levels and geographic scales to
form more redundant systems is \polycentricity." Polycentric systems theory argues that there are
various, interlapping sets of institutions that govern human interactions (McGinnis, 1999). Sys-
tems are more polycentric to the degree that there are more nodes of decision-making, and more
unicentric the fewer the nodes of decision-making. The polycentricity of production has been exam-
ined in multiple contexts (McGinnis, 1999). Ostrom (2001) summarizes the benets of polycentric
environmental governance:
\The strength of polycentric governance systems in coping with complex, dynamic bio-
1Stability of the system is compromised when there is a lack of redundancy among subsystems. Low et al. (2003)
argue that scholars and policymakers often overlook redundant subsystems because they seem wasteful and inecient.
In our example of the cardiovascular system, if there were only one blood cell, if that blood cell failed the whole
system would crash. While there is only one heart the probability of failure is low enough so that it does not warrant
a redundant pair. Having many blood cells that perform the exact same function, however, is seen as a natural
prerequisite for a stable cardiovascular system. Similarly, states in the U.S. federal system perform many of the
same functions. This redundancy, however, ensures that if one state government fails the system as a whole is not
jeopardized.
2Herbert Simon (1955, 1957) was perhaps the rst to seriously treat human behavior as an outcome from a complex
adaptive system. He asserts that: \The outer environment determines the conditions for goal attainment...[and] the
inner system is adopted to the environment, so that its behavior will be determined in large part by the behavior of
the latter...The behavior takes the shape of the task environment" (Simon, 1981). In the words of Gigerenzer and
Goldstein (1996, p.397), \bounded rationality is like a pair of scissors: the mind is one blade, and the structure of
the environment is the other." Thus, the internal processing of information and the cognitive tendencies to respond
to stimuli are one sources of human complexity, while the institutional environment provides another sources of
complexity.
3physical systems is that each of the subunits has considerable autonomy to experiment
with diverse rules for using a particular type of resource system and with dierent re-
sponse capabilities to external shock. In experimenting with rule combinations within
the smaller-scale units of a polycentric system, citizens and ocials have access to local
knowledge, obtain rapid feedback from their own policy changes, and can learn from the
experience of other parallel units. Instead of being a major detriment to system perfor-
mance, redundancy builds in considerable capabilities. If there is only one governance
unit for a very large geographic area, the failure of that unit to respond adequately
to external threats may mean a very large disaster for the entire system. If there are
multiple governance units, organized at dierent levels for the same geographic region,
the failure of one or more of these units to respond to external threats may lead to
small-scale disasters that may be compensated by the successful reaction of other units
in the system."
2.2 Biophysical Systems
Ecosystems fundamentally provide life support on earth (Lovelock, 1979). Ecosystems are also
intrinsically interconnected. Changes in one part of the system can eect change within that
system, in adjacent systems, with water cycles, and with the atmosphere. The uncertainties of
these connections in the biogeophysical system make institutional design especially dicult (Folke
et al., 2007). Folke et al. (2007) have identied four major ecosystem characteristics that make
institutional arrangements complex: rst, they are dynamically variable, that is they constantly
change over time and there is often no obvious steady state equilibrium path, no \balance of nature"
(Botkin, 1990)3; second, ecosystems are spatially heterogeneous and their boundaries are dicult
to dene (Fitzsimmons, 2001); third, they are adaptive (Wilson et al., 1994; Holling, 1986); and
fourth, disturbances are a normal part of ecosystem change (Botkin, 1990; Holling et al., 1995).
2.3 Complex SESs and External Validity
A long tradition of Dr. Ostrom's and her collaborators work on polycentric governance has recently
been married to the eld of complex adaptive systems (Ostrom, 2009). Combining the work of
complex adaptive systems with polycentric systems produces a coherent framework to analyze
complex SESs; however, such a framework also gives analytical challenges to policy scholars who
take the complexity of the human and natural environment seriously. If one of the main benets
from a polycentric systems is the \autonomy to experiment with diverse rules" in order to \learn
from the experiences of parallel units" one must seriously consider what can be validly inferred
from one unit's experiment with dierent rule congurations. Will successful rule conguration in
one unit of a polycentric system imply a similar set of rules will be successful elsewhere, and if so,
why or why not?
3Not only do ecosystems change, but they may do so either linearly or nonlinearly or chaotically. Chaotic systems
pose a particularly dicult challenge. It is dicult to predict environmental eects far enough in advance to be useful
for management. Institutions tend to be linear (adjusting slowly over time) and relatively stable (Tullock, Seldon
and Brady, 2002), even if they might undergo rapid changes in short intervals (Jones, 2001), and thus be insucient
to respond to rapidly changing natural systems. For example, in climate change the current policy choices range
from mandating gradual reductions, changing pollution technologies, and altering patterns of land use. However,
if the climate is chaotic, the policy adjustments may be much too slow to respond. Regeneration rates of many
sheries, especially heterogeneous sheries, exhibit chaotic characteristics as well. Wilson et al. (1994) have shown
the mismatch between many existing institutions and chaotic sheries. They argue that new institutions need to
be created that allow local knowledge of shery conditions in order to minimize information costs. This should be
coupled with a hierarchal institutional structure which takes into account broader eects as well.
4This research challenges policy scholars to think carefully about the nature of policy interven-
tions and their relevance for situations that dier from the particular social-ecological system the
scholar happens to study. Given the great diversity of institutional arrangements (Aoki, 2001;
Ostrom, 2005) and the great diversity in biophysical processes (Folke et al., 2007), it is natural to
wonder if any external inference can be made at all from the study of a single, or small group of
social-ecological systems. If some external generalization is possible, what are the key characteris-
tics that a researcher should identify as being relevant for such a generalization?
Often the set of key characteristics necessary for external generalization are not supplied by the
intervention theory. For example, many researchers have argued that decentralized governance can
improve the management of natural resources, without specifying under what types of conditions
decentralization is likely to be successful and under which types of conditions it is likely to fail.
Without a rigorous theory that explicitly emphasizes such conditions, any empirical study of de-
centralization is bound to be limited to the particular case being studied. At best such empirical
tests provide a multitude of incompatible results which are unexplainable beyond generating lists
of countries where decentralization has \worked" and \failed" (Treisman, 2007). At worst, results
from any particular study may be cherry-picked to support a position favored by a policymaker,
regardless of the appropriateness of decentralization for the problem at hand (Ribot, Agrawal and
Larson, 2006).
Complex social-ecological systems will most often have complex answers about the eectiveness
of a particular policy intervention. The intervention is bound to have multiple eects, some positive,
others negative, as well as distributional eects, being successful among some group of people but
less successful among others. For example, creating well-dened property rights for some forest
users may increase the incentives to invest in forest resources, but may simultaneously make the
population more vulnerable to forest disturbance if the asset portfolio of the group becomes more
reliant on forest investments. Also, while such property rights may benet the forest users who
receive such property rights, they may exclude and marginalize others who do not receive property
rights. Policymakers often want to know \does the policy work?" but policy scholars are cautioned
to carefully examine for whom the policy is benecial, and to evaluate the policy on multiple
dimensions. Too often, policy analysis is concerned with estimating an Average Treatment Eect
(ATE)4 for a single outcome in the target population; however, policies have dierent treatment
eects for dierent types of people.
Estimating heterogeneous policy treatment eects may provide leverage in the exercise of de-
termining the populations for which policy eects will be externally valid. For example, if the
estimated treatment eects are positive for female participants and negative for male participants,
such a conclusion may imply that male subjects are better targeted by such a policy in the future,
rather than female subjects. Treatment eect heterogeneity due to social complexity does not, per
se, imply that no external validity is possible, but does challenges us to think carefully about the
conditions under which generalization is possible. Threats to external validity based upon the types
of subjects that can be expected to behave in the same way as those being studied is referred to as
population validity.
However, the generalization of policy interventions is also threatened by another class of prob-
lems. Ecological validity refers to the conditions under which the treatment eects can be expected
to similar to the policy being studied. This class of problems directly reects many of the dif-
culties inherent in complex, polycentric social-ecological systems research. If the environmental
characteristics of the policy systematically aect the estimated treatment eects, then one need to
specify the environmental conditions under which generalizations of policy analysis can be made.
4The ATE is dened as the average eect of the program across the entire target population.
5Bracht and Glass (1968) describe the two classes of external validity:
Population Validity deals with generalizations to populations of persons (What population
of subjects can be expected to behave in the same way as did the sample experimental
subjects?)
Ecological Validity deals with the \environment" of the intervention (Under what conditions,
i.e., settings, treatments, experimenters, dependent variables, etc., can the same results be
expected?)
Identifying the conditions under which the estimated treatment eects are likely to hold is
dicult. Theories in economics and political science are usually largely devoid of context. The
tragedy of the commons does not specify for which groups and for which CPRs and at which
times the theory is likely to hold. Holding some conditions constant to test a theory may often
be important, to infer if it is possible that a given construct A can, under some conditions, cause
a change in some construct B.5 However, in the applied policy world, the onus is to demonstrate
that the policy intervention will work in a particular context and to understand how the policy
intervention will react with facets of the SES.
3 Taking Biophysical Conditions Seriously
In a recent paper Xavier Basurto and I (Basurto and Coleman, 2010) analyzed two small-scale
pen shell (bi-valve mollusks) sheries in the Gulf of California in Mexico. We were puzzled by
the apparent discrepancy in outcomes between the two groups using the sheries, given that both
groups have a similar ethnic background and similar institutional history. The Seri shing village
of Punta Chueca has avoided overexploitation of the pen shell stock while the neighboring shing
village of Kino Viejo has not. Even though they are located only 30 km apart from one another
(Figure 1), share the same general ecosystem, harvest the same species and use the same harvesting
technology.6
5When testing a theory it is often desirable to hold environmental conditions at a level favorable for theory testing,
insofar as this is possible. To test theories of gravity it is desirable to experiment in spaces with little or no friction.
Even though such conditions do not reect the real world, insights from the behavior of gravity, holding friction
constant, can tell us something about gravity. Of course, further experiments would need to be performed to assess
how the results of a gravity-experiment would generalize to situations where there is friction. Cook and Campbell
(1976, p.83) argue that when a researcher's interest is mainly theoretical, the inference of external validity is of little
concern: \For persons interested in theory testing it is almost as important to show that the variables involved in the
research are constructs A and B (construct validity) as it is to show that the relationship is causal and goes from one
variable to the other (internal validity). Few theories specify crucial target settings, populations, or times to or across
which generalization is desired. Consequently, external validity is of relatively little importance. In practice, it is
often sacriced for the greater statistical power that comes through having isolated settings, standardized procedures,
and homogeneous respondent populations. For investigators with theoretical interests our estimate is that the types
of validity, in order of importance, are probably internal,construct, statistical conclusion, and external validity."
6Evidence for this assertion comes from several sources: comparison of catch per unit of eort (CPUE) in both
sites; interviews with shers on their recollections of historical catches complemented with recent ocial records
of landed catch; underwater surveys to estimate pen shell densities at both sites; and diversication of Kino Viejo
catches in response to unsustainable numbers of pen shells year-around. See Basurto and Coleman (2010) for details
on the sources.
6Figure 1: Location of the Inernillo Channel, the Seri village (Punta Chueca),
and the Kino Viejo village. Cartographic design: Nicholas Mallos.
The Seri have established institutions for the use of their shery but the village of Kino Viejo
has an open access regime. The Seri frequently monitor the use of the shery and have rules related
to harvesting (e.g. one member of the group must be on all shing boats) and boundary rules (e.g.
outsiders must be approved by the group and they are not allowed to sh in years when the sh
population is low or in culturally important areas). It is not immediately obvious why the Seri
people would have such institutions but the people of Kino Viejo would not. In order to explain
dierences in institutional conditions, and the resulting dierences in ecological outcomes, one must
consider dierences in ecosystem properties across the two sites.
Broadly speaking, the ecological systems where the Seri and Kino Viejo's sheries take place
are similar except in one important regard: The most extensive meadows of eelgrass in Western
Mexico are located in Seri shing grounds (Felger and Moser, 1985), while eelgrass meadows are
essentially absent in Kino Viejo shing grounds (Torre-Cos o, 2002). Torre-Cos o (2002) argued
that the large extent of eelgrass inside the Inernillo Channel is due to the long eelgrass life cycle
in comparison to other areas in the Gulf of California and to its shallow depths and particular
current patterns, which also contribute to keep seeds in the same areas, determining the stability
and distributional patterns of eelgrass beds. These favorable biophysical characteristics are absent
in Kino Viejo shing grounds, which help explain eelgrasses limited spatial and temporal presence
there. The extent of the presence of eelgrass meadows in each shery plays an important role in
each shery's carrying capacity. We argued that such discrepancies in ecological conditions can be
modeled as dierences in carrying capacity in the two sites.
Using a slight variation on the standard logistic population growth model (modied to allow for
a minimum viable population), calibrated with growth parameters for pen shells, we examined how
dierences in carrying capacity can eect what types of institutions are likely to emerge and the
resulting ecological conditions. First we dened institutions along two dimensions: the timeliness
with which they are adopted and the strength (i.e. the amount of behavioral change that is required)
of the institution. The modeling exercise is meant to assume a situation in which two places are
exactly equivalent in every respect, i.e. the same capacity to adopt strong and timely institutions,
7and then assess how small dierences in the carrying capacity between the two sites would aect
the sustainability of the shery.
3.1 Simulation
We simulated a number of scenarios to explore how the same capacity for institutional advancement
may not result in similar outcomes across the two sites. We assumed that both shing sites start o
with a level of harvesting eort that is unsustainable at both sites, and that after a certain amount
of time, , regimes in both locations switch to a low-eort regime. The two institutional variables,
then, are the dierence in harvesting eorts in the two regimes, E1 and E2 and the timeliness of
adoption. Table 1 reports the results of the simulation. An ecological variable distinguishes the
two sites, and the Kino Viejo village is assume to have 80 percent of the carrying capacity of the
Seri village.7
Table 1: Simulation Results
Label E1 E1  Seri site Kino Viejo site
Moderate 0.25 0.1 5 Recover Recover
Institutions 0.25 0.1 10 Recover Crash (15 years)a
(60% less harvesting eort) 0.25 0.1 15 Recover Crash (13 years)a
0.25 0.1 20 Crash (29 years)a Crash (13 years)a
Strong 0.25 0.05 5 Recover Recover
Institutions 0.25 0.05 10 Recover Crash (16 years)a
(80% less harvesting eort) 0.25 0.05 15 Recover Crash (13 years)a
0.25 0.05 20 Crash (32 years)a Crash (13 years)a
Weak 0.25 0.2 5 Recover Crash (15 years)a
Institutions 0.25 0.2 10 Recover Crash (14 years)a
(20% less harvesting eort) 0.25 0.2 15 Crash (31 years)a Crash (13 years)a
0.25 0.2 20 Crash (27 years)a Crash (13 years)a
a Year at which the stock is less than 1.
3.2 Discussion
There are at least four points to note from the simulation. First, is the important role of the eect
of dierences in carrying capacity. It is clear that the Kino Viejo site crashes under a greater
number of scenarios than the Seri site. Take, for example, the moderate institutions case in Table
1. Here, harvesting eort declines by 60 percent (harvesting declines from 25 percent of the sh
stock per year to 10 percent of the sh stock per year). If it takes both communities 10 years
to adopt this moderate institution, then the Seri site will recover, while the Kino Viejo site will
crash after 15 years. This is driven completely by the dierences in carrying capacity at the two
sites, as the reduction in harvesting rate, time to adoption of the new institutions, and all else
are constant across sites. This implies that two dierent shing communities, dierentiated solely
7Robustness checks for varying the relative carrying capacity were also reported in the paper. The 80 percent
carrying capacity assumption is generous in this application (the carrying capacity in Kino Viejo is probably a lower
fraction than for the Seri); but the results presented here are only strengthened if lower carrying capacities are
assumed.
8by the environments' carrying capacity, and adopting the same institutions within the same time
frame may have very dierent results. At the Kino Viejo site, the biophysical environment will
simply not support a 10 year time frame to adopt moderate institutions, while the Seri site will.
Second, both aspects of institutional development are important. Even with strong institutions
(harvesting eort severely reduced) the simulation results indicate that institutions must be adopted
within a reasonable time frame or both populations may crash. Even when Kino Viejo adopts
institutions in 10 years the population crashes under every scenario. At the Seri site, the community
must adopt institutions before 20 years or it will eventually collapse despite the strength of the
institutions it adopts. Also, if both sites adopt even moderate institutions within 5 years, both sites
will maintain a sustainable harvest. Only at Kino Viejo when weak institutions are implemented,
although quickly adopted (within 5 years) institutions fail to sustain the resource. Institutional
strength is especially important for Kino Viejo, which always crashes if it adopts weak institutions
(reduced harvesting by only 20 percent), independent of how quickly it is able to adopt them.
From this simulation it appears that for the Seri, with better biophysical conditions, continued
sustainable harvests are less sensitive to the strength of the institutions; it is more important that
they are adopted quickly. In fact, this appears to be the strategy taken by the shers from the Seri
community.8
Third, our simulation results also showed that the more timely and stronger the institutions, the
longer the community can continue harvesting, even if the shery ultimately crashes. Institutional
adoption delays the time to collapse and provides resources over a longer time period. Furthermore,
even if the institutions are unsuccessful at maintaining long-term harvests for that specic shery
they may provide a foundation for cooperation in future endeavors, especially if local actors are
able to transfer these relations to other interaction arenas, whether they are related to shing or
not. Thus, even if shing institutions ultimately fail, they may play an important role in building
trust and reciprocity ties among community members.
Fourth, it is worth mentioning that if the two sites adopt the same strength of institutions,
within the same time frame, one site might be able to sustain the shery while the other might
fail, simply because the carrying capacity is dierent. It is important to note that dierences in
carrying capacity are not greatly exaggerated in this example. The carrying capacity at Kino Viejo
is assumed to be 80 percent of the carrying capacity the Seri site. If carrying capacity diers even
more (if the carrying capacity is even lower in the disadvantage site), as is apt to be the case,
then the outlook is even bleaker to disadvantaged sites. That is, when comparing two sites with
drastically dierent carrying capacities, it is unrealistic to believe that the site with poor carrying
capacity will be able to erect and maintain local institutions that would sustain a similar shing
eort to the site with a higher carrying capacity. Students of collective action need to be particularly
careful when assessing the eects of a given institution, because underlying ecological conditions
8Asking Seri sher informants about the timing and process by which institutions to control shing eort emerged
in the Seri community corroborated this nding. Interviewees consistently indicated that institutions emerged very
quickly in the face of a perceived external threat. Fishing eort for pen shells spiked up in the mid 1980's (the
shery started around 1978) as a result of the overexploitation of other more easily available valuable sh species
(Basurto, 2006). The increased presence of outsiders on Seri shing grounds prompted a strong and prominent Seri
leader to quickly enact two important rules to control access to shing grounds inside the Channel: a) That outsiders
needed to pay for a shing permit and that b) a member of the community must become part of the shing crew.
Our interviews also suggest that there was no formal collective-choice process involved in the enactment of these
rules in the sense of having communal gatherings to make consensus-based decisions, as this would be foreign to
Seri decision-making practices. Among the Seri discussions and collective-choice process take place through informal
gatherings in small groups with fellow shers and neighbors. The fact that these rules became immediately accepted
and viewed as legitimate by the Seri community speaks to the leader's legitimacy on the eyes of fellow communal
members, and to the pragmatic fact that these rules brought clear short-term benets to many members of the Seri
community in the form of monetary income (see Basurto, 2005).
9can greatly modify the ecacy of institutions. Some of the core problems of environmental policy
analysis lie in showing that institutions cause or can modify an environmental outcome, and our
analysis suggests a complex, interactive eect between institutions and ecological factors. Analysts
of environmental policy and ecological economics should be careful to model and explain these
interactions before concluding that institutions are or are not eective (Young, 2002).
3.3 Lessons
Without a thorough understanding of the biophysical processes operating in these two sheries in
the Gulf of California, a policy analyst might conclude that the Seri people were more ingenious or
somehow more interested in sustaining the sh stock. Or perhaps, one might conclude that where
there are institutions there are sure to be sustainable resources; when in fact we argue a more
correct conclusion is that a high ecological carrying capacity caused institutional eectiveness and
institutional eectiveness in turn caused sustainable harvests.
If we fail to provide empirically-supported data of conditions under which communities might
succeed or fail to develop robust local institutions for the governance of their CPRs overtime, we
risk the chance that these institutions, no matter how well-designed, cannot perform well given
the ecological constraints at a particular site. Supporting the formation of strong local institutions
is no panacea for sustainability. In many instances local institutions cannot do it alone. Our
ndings suggest that initial endowments of natural capital are critical for the emergence and later
sustainability of collective action. In other words, the resilience of the CPR, through elevated levels
of ecological carrying capacity, might provide shers with crucial time to learn-by-doing, gain trust
with one another, and develop other basic ingredients that are thought to increase the likelihood
that successful collective action will emerge (Ostrom, 2005).
4 Taking Heterogeneity in Social Systems Seriously
Recent criticism has been directed at many of the programs meant to deal with climate change
because they do not adequately account for the local actors most vulnerable to climate change
(Ribot, 2010; Ostrom, 2010). For example, as currently outlined in eorts to Reduce Emissions
from Deforestation and Degradation (REDD+), eorts to encourage reductions in deforestation
will be channeled through the national governments which then are supposed to indirectly compen-
sate local forest users (Phelps, Webb and Agrawal, 2010). Those who depend most heavily upon
forest resources are likely to be the most vulnerable to the eects of climate change (Mendelsohn
et al., 2007) and new REDD+ policies may re-centralize the control over forest resources that has
developed over the last 20 years (Phelps, Webb and Agrawal, 2010).
Before embarking on such a drastic change in policy some evidence should be marshalled to
suggest to what extent national governments are better able to plan responses to climate change
than local forests users. There is still much uncertainty as to how the rural poor will adapt to
the challenges of climate change in the future, although in the past many forest users have been
able to adapt to disturbances and continue to manage long-enduring resource systems (Ostrom,
1990). It is impossible to investigate the eects of climate change which have not yet happened;
however, examining past responses to major disturbances may provide insight into how forest users
will respond to climate change induced disturbances in the future.
104.1 Property Rights and Adaptive Capacity
To investigate how dierent groups of forest users respond to disturbance, I have examined, using
a unique dataset on community forestry, the propensity to have sustainable forest outcomes as
a function of the rights given to forest user groups. Groups of forest users are likely to alter
their responses to disturbance depending on the institutions which constrain or enhance the set of
possible decisions they can make. It is generally recognized that there are bundles of property rights
associated with natural resources (Barzel, 1997; Schlager and Ostrom, 1992; McKean, 2000). These
bundles of rights may be held in common, privately, by the state, or by nobody at all (open access)
(McKean, 2000). In addition, dierent parties may hold dierent bundles of the property rights.
For example, in many countries the residual claimant (the party to which all unspecied rights
belong, see Coleman and Steed (2009)) of forest land is held by the state, while local communities
may have property rights to appropriate timber or other forest products and outside tourists may
hold rights of access to the forest. Thus, the property rights to the resource are dispersed over
many dierent holders of those rights.
Despite the recognition that there are bundles of property rights associated with any given
resource, there appears to still be a tendency for academics and policymakers to oversimplify
resource ownership as wholly private, common, state, or open access (See McKean, 2000). Virulent
debates have emerged to argue that one ownership type is superior to all others (See Ostrom, 1990;
Ostrom, Janssen and Anderies, 2007), but little research has examined what stakeholders are best
able to exercise which bundles of rights to achieve environmentally sustainable outcomes.9 In order
to assess local rights, I try to move beyond the over-simplied labels of private, community, and
government.
Schlager and Ostrom (1992) identify and classify property rights and distinguish the diverse
bundles of rights of natural resources. They classify property rights holders into four categories:
authorized users who have rights of access and withdrawal; claimants who have rights to manage
the resource; proprietors who have rights to exclude others from using the resource; and owners who
have rights of alienation|they can divest themselves of the resource. The rights associated with the
resource should not be confused with the type of rights holder. Individuals, national governments,
or groups of forest users may be authorized users, claimants, proprietors, or owners. Schlager
and Ostrom (1992) argue that if property rights holders have bundles of rights approaching full
ownership rather than mere access, they will be more likely to invest in the resource. For example,
owners of forest land will be more likely to invest in eorts to monitor the use of the forest than
authorized users.
Common property rights in forests are given to user groups. \A user group is a group of people
who harvest from, use, and/or maintain one or more forests and who share the same rights and
duties to products from the forest(s), even though they may or may not be formally organized
(International Forestry Resources and Institutions, 2008, p.III.A.5-1)." User groups hold common
property rights; a group of people jointly hold some subset of the bundle of rights. Such arrange-
ments are quite common in many parts of the world (Agrawal, Chhatre and Hardin, 2008) and are
often eective institutional arrangements for the sustainable management of forests (Chhatre and
Agrawal, 2009).
Most research on climate change adaptation stresses the role of technology (such as providing
9Although recent research has examined the relative eectiveness of vesting full ownership rights to private in-
dividuals, user groups, or states (Hayes and Ostrom, 2005; Ostrom and Nagendra, 2006; Coleman, 2009; Chhatre
and Agrawal, 2009). This literature largely concludes that no single owner is signicantly more likely to sustainably
manage forests, although Chhatre and Agrawal (2009) nd that local users with ownership rights are more likely to
have more forest biomass than national governments or private individuals.
11information on weather forecasts or early warning systems, (see Stern, 2007, ch.18)) to respond
to such disturbances and largely ignores the role of social institutions such as property rights
(Agrawal, 2010). While technological interventions may benet those producing and providing such
technology, creating robust institutional conditions may simultaneously improve adaptive capacity
as well as benet the forest-dependent poor. Other policy advise focuses on national-level policies
such as integrating climate change impact models into national policymaking and the creation
of national climate change ministries for coordination and planning (Stern, 2007, ch.20). What
little policy advise there is that focuses on local social institutions is largely conned to variables
that are not easily inuenced by direct policy intervention, such as increasing the resilience of
livelihoods and infrastructure, improved governance, and community empowerment (Stern, 2007,
ch.20). Unfortunately, less emphasis has been placed on analyzing local property rights which are
more directly amenable to policy change (Agrawal, 2010).
A user groups' property rights bundle endowment modies their ability to respond to distur-
bance. There is a relative paucity of research on such intuitions, which is alarming given the central
role of local institutions in adapting to climate change (Agrawal, 2010). Here I provide a compara-
tive empirical analysis of dierent property rights bundle endowments on the ability of forest user
groups to adapt to external disturbance through changes in investment activities.
4.2 Property Rights, Rival Users, and Organizational Capacity
My purpose here is not to give a complete prole of adaptive capacity of forest user groups. Rather,
the purpose is to examine a subset of social factors that have been linked to adaptive capacity and to
assess how such factors modify the eects of an important policy variable, property rights. I examine
one of the determinants of adaptive capacity from Engle and Lemos (2010): organizational/social
capital. Social capital has long been linked to successful resource governance (Ostrom, 1999). I
am particularly interested in organizational capacity within activities undertaken in the forest. If
a user group has cooperated in the past to collectively monitor each other, for example, it might
be much more likely to respond to disturbance collectively.
I also examine the presence of rival users in the forest. If there are multiple user groups that
compete for forest products it will probably be dicult for any one user group to successfully act
collectively and respond favorably to disturbance, given that other user groups can disregard this
behavior and still respond unfavorably. The presence of rival users is a biophysical and social factor
because it directly emphasizes the isolation of a user groups to other users which depends both on
the spatial distribution of users as well as patterns of human activity.
My primary interest is to examine the role of property rights and to assess how organizational
capacity and the presence of rival users change the incentives to respond to a disturbance. The
hypothesized relationships between rival users, organizational capacity, and dierent property rights
are presented in Table 2. The signs in the table represent hypothesized relationships of each
variable on forest conditions after a disturbance. For example, the   in the upper-left cell between
management rights and rival users implies the following hypothesis: as the number of rival users
increase for groups with management rights, forest conditions will worsen.
First consider the eects of dierent property rights bundles as the number of rival users increase.
Those with management rights may create rules that limit harvesting in the absence of rival groups,
but as the number of rival groups increases the rules which they create can only be enforced on
their group, and not on rival groups, so they will be less eective. The rights of exclusion, on the
other hand, will be most eective in situations where there are rival user groups to exclude. The
eects of exclusion rights will be the most pronounced in forests where there are many rival groups.
Alienation rights are expected to have a negative impact on forest conditions when there are rivals.




Management Rights   +
Exclusion Rights +  
Alienation Rights    
User groups may nd it more protable not to reinvest in a forest that has just experienced a
disturbance, or may have no immediate political obligations to do so. User groups with exclusion
rights may be required by law to meet forest management objectives, while groups with alienation
rights can make decisions that leave the forest in a poor condition without accountability to others.
Next consider the eects of dierent property rights bundles as the organizational capacity of
the user group increases. User groups with management rights and high organizational capacity
are better able to design and implement rules for the forest than groups with low organizational
capacity. On the other hand, if such groups have the ability to exclude others from the benets to be
gained from organization, then they may be more likely to mobilize the organizational capacity to
harvest the forest. If user groups possess alienation rights, they may be eectively able to mobilize
and nd buyers or renters for forest products and thus continue harvests after a disturbance.
Thus, the relationship between dierent types of adaptive capacity, and their interaction, may
theoretically constrain or enhance the ability of property rights to achieve sustainable forest out-
comes. Again, in this paper I do not consider the full range of adaptive capacities, but instead
show that even among a subset of those capacities, policies implementing dierent bundles of prop-
erty rights might be expected to have vastly dierent outcomes depending upon dierent levels of
adaptive capacity.
4.3 Data Analysis
To investigate the hypotheses outline in Table 2, I analyze data from 326 user groups from forests
in 13 countries around the world. Table 3 presents the distribution of user groups across countries
for the data used in this analysis.10 The data is collected from the International Forestry Resources
and Institutions (IFRI) program.11
The IFRI program is an eort by a worldwide network of colleagues to analyze forestry and
the local user groups which access the forests. IFRI researchers use a standard instrument to
collect data; this data is then compiled into a worldwide dataset. Data is collected both on forest
biophysical characteristics (through forest mensuration techniques) and on the institutional and
socioeconomic characteristics of forest users (through ethnographic techniques). Thus, the data
represent a consistent way to analyze forest users management practices as well as the biophysical
outcomes which result from such practices (Coleman, 2009). IFRI presents a unique opportunity
to analyze forest commons with cross national data (Ostrom and Nagendra, 2006; Chhatre and
10These data do not represent a random sample of all forests in the world or even in the given countries; it is
dicult to imagine a process for such sampling. However, none of the sampled user groups were chosen on the basis
of the outcomes analyzed in this paper, so the inferences here can be generalized to user groups with similar ranges
of the independent variables (See Coleman, 2009)
11See International Forestry Resources and Institutions (2008) for a discussion of the data collection process and
Gibson, McKean and Ostrom (2000) for an introduction to IFRI analysis.




BHU 2 0.61 0.61
BOL 18 5.52 6.13
BRA 4 1.23 7.36
GUA 12 3.68 11.04
HON 5 1.53 12.58
IND 59 18.10 30.67
KEN 37 11.35 42.02
MAD 23 7.06 49.08
MEX 18 5.52 54.60
NEP 66 20.25 74.85
TAN 12 3.68 78.53
THA 1 0.31 78.83
UGA 69 21.17 100.00
Total 326 100.00
Notes: Data from (International Forestry
Resources and Institutions, 2008).
Agrawal, 2009; Coleman, 2009; Coleman and Steed, 2009).
4.3.1 Description of Data
A subset of the data collected through IFRI is used in this paper.12 Table 4 reports the data,
divided into four categories of variables: the dependent variable which measures forest outcomes,
variables which measure the bundle of property rights with which a particular forest user groups
has been endowed, measures of adaptive capacity, and a set of control variables including a variable
indicating disturbance.
The outcome variable is a subjective measure of forest conditions as assessed by the user group.
It is dichotomized to indicate if forest conditions are better for ecologically similar forests in the
region (=1); or if they are worse (=0).
Also included in Table 4 are various measures of the bundle of property rights which the user
group enjoys. Rights of access and withdrawal are not included as all user groups coded in the
IFRI database have such rights. As part of the coding process for IFRI forms, user groups must
be able to at least access the forest. Rights of management indicate that the user group has
relative autonomy to make and enforce rules within the forest, and 41% of user groups have such
rights. Exclusion rights indicate that only one user group can make rules and thus exclude others
and about 29% of user groups have these rights. Alienation rights refer to rights to sell or lease
the aforementioned rights. Only 6% of user groups possess alienation rights; these are private
12Data for most user groups was included, but observations for which there was missing variables was eliminated.
Approximately 75 observations were eliminated by listwise deletion because of missingness. Data from U.S. sites were
not included, nor were data from leasehold forests in Nepal, for which there are serious reverse causality problems
because property right were given to local communities in leasehold forest precisely because they had historically
been mismanaged and had poor ecological conditions.
14Table 4: Summary Statistics
N Mean Std.Dev. Min Max
Outcome
Forest Conditions 326 0.36 0.48 0.00 1.00
Property Rights
Management Rights 326 0.41 0.49 0.00 1.00
Exclusion Rights 326 0.29 0.46 0.00 1.00
Alienation Rights 326 0.06 0.23 0.00 1.00
Adaptive Capacity
Organizational Capacity 326 3.00 1.44 1.00 5.00
Number of Other User Groups 326 1.30 1.53 0.00 5.00
ln(Distance) 326 0.77 0.56 0.00 2.83
Control Variables
Tree Density Decrease 326 0.53 0.50 0.00 1.00
ln(Scarcity) 326  1.65 2.32  7.20 4.22
ln(Forest Size) 326 5.88 1.94  0.11 10.03
Forest Subsistence 326 0.76 0.37 0.00 1.00
Conservation/Aesthetic Objectives 326 0.05 0.22 0.00 1.00
Notes: Data from (International Forestry Resources and Institutions, 2008).
forest owners or indigenous groups that have exclusive rights to a forest. As in Schlager and
Ostrom (1992) these rights are nested; that is, those with alienation rights possess exclusion and
management rights. The variables in this analysis are coded as such. The eects of alienation
rights, for example, should be interpreted as the eects of having rights to alienation in addition
to the rights of management and exclusion.
As hypothesized in Table 2, the aects of property rights are attenuated by the number of
potential rival claimants to those rights and the organizational capacity of the user group. The
maximum number of rival groups is 5 in any given forest and for some forests there are no other rival
groups.13 Another variable is also included to measure the potential impacts of rivalry and that is
the (natural logarithm of) distance to the closest market (in kilometers). Even if user groups are
not currently using the forest, the distance to market is a proxy variable indicating the possibility
that latent groups could challenge the property rights of the user group. I analyze this variable to
conrm the results of the eects of groups which are already formed.
The organizational capacity of the user group is taken from an index of activities that the user
group engages in. Four measures are used to assess organizational capacity: the frequency with
which the group cooperates to harvest forest products, to monitor and sanction forest users, and
to engage in forest maintenance activities. Each of these variable is on a scale of 1   4, where 1
indicates the group never cooperates on such activities; 2 indicates they cooperate \occasionally";
3 indicates they cooperate \seasonally"; and 4 indicates they cooperate \year round." The fourth
variable is a binary indicator of whether the group has had a disruptive conict in the last two
13Table 6 in the Appendix shows the distribution of other user groups. The most frequent number of other user
groups is 0 (about 46% of user groups in the sample are the sole user group in the forest). However, for about 54%
of the user groups there is at least one other user group in the forest.
15years which disrupted normal activities. I examined two methods to construct the index, ultimately
choosing the second method. First a simple additive index was examined, but there is some concern
that such an index does not adequately weight dierent aspects of organizational capacity. Instead,
I use an index based upon a principle components analysis of the four indicators. The scores from
the rst principle component are used as the index (the rst principle component explains 49% of
the variation among the four variables). The principle component scores were then divided into
quintiles to facilitate interpretation|the rst qunitile is composed of those user groups that have
the lowest 20% of organizational capacity, while the fth quintile is composed of those user groups
that have the highest 20% of organizational capacity.14
The measure of disturbance is an indicator if there was a signicant decrease in tree density
in the past 5 years. The reasons for such a decrease ranged from exogenous natural disturbances
(such as re, ooding, or wind damage), to exogenous institutional change (encroachment on the
forest from other groups, roads, or market access for forest products), to endogenous user group
behavior (over-harvesting) or some combination of all three. In the majority (56%) of cases tree
density decreases are attributed solely by exogenous change. While it would be helpful to separate
purely exogenous change from endogenous change this is dicult because both processes often act
simultaneously; thus for this analysis I look at all disturbances that decrease tree density.
A number of other control variables are also included in the analysis. Scarcity is measured by
(the natural logarithm of) the number of households per forest hectare. If there is much pressure
on the forest then forest users may be less able to act collectively to respond to disturbance (See
Coleman, Fleischman and Bauer, 2009). Forest size is measured by the (natural logarithm of)
forested hectares and presents a scale eect. Those in large forests may have more valuable assets
and thus more incentive to adapt to changes (Chhatre and Agrawal, 2009). Forest subsistence is
measured by the proportion of households in the user group that rely on the forest for subsistence
and ranges 0 to 1. This is an especially important control because it severely limits how much user
groups can restrain from harvesting if the costs of doing so are extremely high for a large proportion
of the group. High subsistence user groups may not be able to limit harvesting in the forest if doing
so would endanger many of its households from subsisting. On the other hand low subsistence
groups may be able to delay harvesting while the forest recovers from the disturbance event. A
control variable is also included to indicate the type of forest. If the forest is a nature preserve or
sacred forest there may be more of a norm to restrain from harvesting after a disturbance and such a
designation may provoke proactive measures to ensure good forest conditions, such as more careful
monitoring of the forest to ensure that sacred elements of the forest are not removed (Coleman and
Steed, 2009).15
4.3.2 Estimation and Inference
To investigate the eects of property rights institutions on adaptation strategies, logit regressions
were run where the dependent variable is a binary variable indicating the conditions of the forest
as ranked by the user group, either above (=1) or below (=0) average for similar forests. This
outcome was regressed on the property rights, adaptive capacity, and control variables described
in Table 4. These results are reported in the rst column of Table 5. Estimated logit coecients
and robust standard errors are reported.
14More detail on the principal components analysis is available from the author upon request.
15A number of other control variables were included at various stages of the analysis such as: the commercial value
of the forest and ease of monitoring. These controls were generally insignicant and the results reported here are
robust to their inclusion. These results are available from the author upon request.
16Table 5: Logit Estimates of Forest Conditions
Types of Interactions
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Other User Organizational
None Groups Capacity Distance
Management Rights 0.376 2.257**  0.718  1.250*
(0.39) (0.96) (1.20) (0.69)
Exclusion Rights 0.114  2.044** 2.084 0.606
(0.47) (0.97) (1.49) (0.76)
Alienation Rights  0.254  0.127 0.362 1.498
(0.59) (0.79) (1.42) (1.04)
Management Rights X Number of Other User Groups  0.826**
(0.41)
Exclusion Rights X Number of Other User Groups 1.815***
(0.63)
Alienation Rights X Number of Other User Groups  0.687
(0.71)
Management Rights X Organizational Capacity 0.304
(0.35)
Exclusion Rights X Organizational Capacity  0.544
(0.40)
Alienation Rights X Organizational Capacity  0.200
(0.38)
Management Rights X ln(Distance) 1.767***
(0.60)
Exclusion Rights X ln(Distance)  0.051
(0.61)
Alienation Rights X ln(Distance)  2.924**
(1.35)
Tree Density Decrease  0.667**  0.851***  0.689**  0.672**
(0.27) (0.28) (0.28) (0.27)
Organizational Capacity  0.047  0.065 0.010  0.038
(0.10) (0.10) (0.12) (0.10)
Number of Other User Groups  0.208*  0.172  0.188*  0.152
(0.11) (0.12) (0.11) (0.11)
ln(Distance)  0.096  0.293  0.087  0.954**
(0.25) (0.28) (0.25) (0.40)
ln(Scarcity)  0.173*  0.138  0.173*  0.150
(0.09) (0.10) (0.10) (0.10)
ln(Forest Size)  0.137  0.138  0.143  0.109
(0.11) (0.12) (0.11) (0.12)
Forest Subsistence 0.501 0.718* 0.483 0.663*
(0.36) (0.38) (0.37) (0.39)
Conservation/Aesthetic Objectives 0.435 0.406 0.419 0.511
(0.52) (0.52) (0.53) (0.54)
Constant 0.152 0.281 0.041 0.402
(0.67) (0.73) (0.71) (0.70)
Log-Likelihood  201.090  194.748  199.344  193.447
AIC 426.180 419.495 428.689 416.894
BIC 471.623 476.299 485.492 473.698
2 23.216** 29.921*** 27.243** 37.953***
N 326 326 326 326
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. Two-tailed hypothesis tests: * p <0.10, ** p <0.05, *** p <0.01.
Column 1 indicates that dierences in common property rights do not signicantly explain for-
est conditions. This nding is contrary to the hypothesized relationships in Schlager and Ostrom
(1992).16 That is, the bundles of specic property rights do not explain forest conditions in re-
sponse to disturbance unconditional on other factors. A more nuanced theory of property rights as
16In fact, the sign of the eects of alienation rights is opposite than expected, implying groups with alienation
rights are less likely to rank forest conditions as above average (although not signicant).
17hypothesized in Table 2 is needed to explain these results. The rst column of Table 5 does show
that user groups are less likely to rank their forest as having above average conditions when there
has been a disturbance in the past 5 years. As for adaptive capacity, organizational capacity is not
a signicant predictor of outcomes, although user groups are less likely to rank forests as above
average as the number of rival groups increases.
Columns 2, 3, and 4 in Table 5 are used to test the hypotheses of Table 2. The second column
interacts the variable indicating the number of other user groups with the property rights bundles.
After conditioning on the number of rival groups, property rights become a signicant predictor of
the user group's ranking of forest conditions. The rst thing to note is that the coecient next to
the specic property rights bundle indicates the eect of property rights when there are no rival
user groups. When there are no rivals, user groups with management rights are more likely to rank
the quality of the forest as above average, holding all else constant (signicant at the 0.05 level),
while user groups with exclusion rights are less likely to rank the forest as above average, holding
all else constant (signicant at the 0.05 level). However, as the number of rivals increase, the eects
of management rights decreases (signicant at the 0.05 level) , while the eects of exclusion rights
increase (signicant at the 0.01 level) holding all else constant. The eects of alienation rights
are not signicantly moderated by the number of other user groups, but the anticipated eects of
management rights and exclusion rights in Table 2 are conrmed by the analysis.
The third column in Table 5 examines the interaction of property rights with organizational
capacity. These hypotheses are rejected by the data analysis; there does not appear to be a
signicant relationship between organizational capacity and forest conditions, despite the types of
property rights which the user group has.
To ensure that the analysis of column 2 is robust a dierent measure of rival groups was
also employed. The distance to market is a proxy for any latent groups that could potentially
challenge property rights holders in the forest. Given the hypotheses of Table 2 I expect that as the
distance to the nearest market increases the potential for rival groups decreases. Thus, as distance
increases management rights should become more important, but exclusion rights should become
less important, while alienation rights should also become more important. The results in Column 3
suggest that if the distance to the nearest market is 1 kilometer (ln(0)=1), then management rights
negatively eect the propensity of the user group to rank the forest as above average. However, as
the distance to markets grows, management rights are associated with a high probability of ranking
the forest in above average conditions, holding all else constant (signicant at the 0.01 level). On
the other hand, exclusion rights are more important when the user group is close to a market, but
less so the farther away the group is from the market. User groups with exclusion rights are less
likely to rank the forest as being above average, the farther they are located from a market, holding
all else constant (signicant at the 0.05 level).
4.3.3 Analysis
The specic research question I ask relates to how user groups rank forest conditions after a distur-
bance, conditional on their property rights, organizational capacity, and the number of rival groups.
Inferences should be made conditional on there being a disturbance in the forest. The estimation
results outlined in the previous section are analyzed in this section conditional on a disturbance
and given the interactions previously discussed. This can be best done by a visual inspection of
the predicted probabilities from the interaction models estimated and reported in Table 5.
Figure 2 reports the estimated eects of property rights conditioning on there being a distur-
bance in the past ve year (Tree Density Decrease=1). Predicted probabilities are examined based
upon the estimated eects of property rights, the number of other user groups, organizational ca-
18pacity, and the distance to market as well as each variable's interaction with property rights. The
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Figure 2: Predicted Probabilities of the user group ranking the forest as above
average for dierent bundles of property rights. The three panels show the pre-
dicted probability that the use group ranks the forest as above average depending
on the property rights when interacting property rights with the number of rival
groups (left panel), organizational capacity (middle panel), and the distance to
market (right panel). Predicted probabilities are calculated from the estimates
of Columns 2, 3, and 4 of table 5 and after conditioning on a disturbance (Tree
Density Decrease=1) and holding all other variables at their median.
The gures reinforce the interpretation of Table 5 from the previous section. I here focus
specically on management and exclusion rights and their interactions with the factors which
measure adaptive capacity. The left panel in Figure 2 shows that when there are few rivals user
groups with management rights are likely to rank the condition of the forest as above average, while
the additional benet of having exclusion rights does not signicantly increase the probability of
ranking the forest conditions as above average. However, as there are more rival user groups,
exclusion rights become more important than management rights, so that by the point when there
are 5 rival groups those with exclusion rights are very likely to rank the value of the forest as above
average.
The middle panel reinforces that there is not a consistent story on the interrelationship between
organizational capacity and property rights. There is no clear evidence that those with high orga-
nizational capacity are more likely to rank the forest as above average, nor that this relationship is
somehow modied by the user group's bundle of property rights.
The right panel shows the relationship between distance to market, property rights, and the
probability of ranking forest conditions above average. More isolated user groups (those further from
markets and latent user groups) are more likely to experience the benets of management rights,
while less isolated user groups are more likely to experience the additional benets of exclusion
rights. Management rights for user groups near markets are not sucient to prevent the user group
from ranking the forest as below average.
Their is surprisingly weak evidence for the eects of alienation rights. User groups with alien-
ation rights appear no more or less likely to rank the forest as above average than those with simply
19access and withdrawal rights, regardless of organizational capacity or the potential of rival groups
to threaten those rights. The strong eects of exclusion may be because absent alienation rights
the user group is \tied to the forest." With no prospects of divesting itself from the resource the
group is forced to adapt to the disturbance rather than let another entity do so. After disturbance
a user group with alienation rights, however can decide it is better o selling the asset to provide
short-term income rather than reinvest.
Another reason for the strong eects of exclusion rights rather than pure alienation rights is
the role of liability. Suppose that the state or a private entity is the owner of the forest and leases
exclusion rights to the user group. They may be liable for any damages done to the forest and thus
have an incentive to invest resources in the face of disturbance. However, if the user group is the
owner of the forest (i.e. it holds alienation rights) then it may be disinclined to make investments
in the face of disturbance if the group has other priorities.
Exclusion rights are the most powerful when there are more rival user groups. If there are
multiple user groups in a forest and one of the user groups has rights of alienation, then other
groups may decide to risk harvesting resources (perhaps contrary to established rules) before the
asset is sold. If the user groups with rights of alienation anticipates this they will be hesitant to
invest in the resource. However, if the user group only has exclusion rights there is no prospect to
divest itself of the resource; thus, other user groups do not have an incentive for risky harvesting
because the asset cannot be sold.
4.4 Discussion
Following the theoretical framework of Schlager and Ostrom (1992), I have explored the eects
of dierent property rights bundles on the propensity of forest user groups to make investments
when faced with disturbance. A number of important ndings emerged. First, it appears that full
ownership rights need not be given to user groups in order to increase the probability that users
will rank the condition of the forest as above normal after a disturbance. Second, exclusion rights
appear to be strongly associated with the user group's ranking of the forest when there are rival
groups, but when there are no such groups that management rights can lead to a greater propensity
to rank the forest above average. Third, the eects of property rights are the most pronounced in
situations where there are rival users who might challenge those property rights, but do not seem
to depend on the organizational capacity of the users.
These ndings have implications for the way scholars treat the concepts of adaptation. This
research strongly suggests that social measures of adaptive capacity may not capture important
interactions between policy and adaptive capacity. If the analysis would have been conned to only
organizational capacity as a potential mediating factor for property rights one might conclude that
property rights are unimportant in determining outcomes after a disturbance. In this paper I have
not addressed a comprehensive measure of adaptive capacity, but I have shown that biophysical
determinants of adaptive capacity have an important role to play in our understanding of policy
interventions that promote adaptation to disturbance.
5 Conclusions
In the rst example of this paper I showed that the biophysical conditions aect the inferences we
draw about a the eectiveness of institutions. In the second example I showed how the complexity
of a human system, if not carefully analyzed, can lead to misleading results about the eectiveness
of institutions. In particular, if one were to examine the eect of property rights, unconditional
on the level of other variables, one would conclude that the provision of property rights may not
20be an eective instrument for forest users to adapt to disturbances. Such an analysis might lend
credence to national governments allocating REDD+ funds and controlling, from above, the actions
of locals in response to climate change. However, after careful examination of the property rights,
a more nuanced interpretation of property rights prevailed|property rights are most important
where there are rival users to challenge those rights and not as important when there are no rival
user groups. This nding has very dierent policy implications.
By digging in and exploring the complexity of institutions and policy interventions, as well as
the diversity of social and ecological condition within which such policies operate, one may gain a
greater understanding of the eects of policy. Without careful consideration of the circumstances
under which a policy is successful or when it will fail, we are limited by the external validity of
our research. In order to make signicant policy advances, we must move beyond estimating single
treatment eects for a single class of individuals or groups and instead focus on the distribution of
policy aects across dierent types of groups, social institutions, and ecologies.
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25A Distribution of Other User Groups




0 150 46.01 46.01
1 58 17.79 63.80
2 41 12.58 76.38
3 35 10.74 87.12
4 30 9.20 96.32
5 12 3.68 100.00
Total 326 100.00
Notes: Data from (International
Forestry Resources and Institutions,
2008).
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